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Abstract Structural models for analyzing competitive markets characterized by homogeneous products
and services such as the energy supply can be traced back to 1920’s. To the authors’ best knowledge, the
literature focuses on pure strategies and analysis for mixed strategies are largely ignored. However, the
characteristic of the energy supply often allows only mixed strategies as a meaningful basis for analyzing
the price competition. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by developing a duopoly model with two
symmetric customers allowing mixed strategies. Nash equilibriums are constructed explicitly when mixed
strategies are defined on a finite set of L discrete points spread in a finite interval and their reciprocals are
equally distanced. Those equilibriums consist of two different types. One is that two players offer the same
starategy, and the other is that each player takes the strategy different from the other. Limiting strategies
as L → ∞ are derived explicitly. These limiting strategies are also shown to be Nash equilibriums in the
context of mixed strategies defined on continuum.
Keywords: Energy, two person game, mixed strategy, limiting strategy
1. Introduction
While the price strategy plays a significant role in any business, it is of crucial importance
to the energy supply industry such as city gas and propane gas because of several reasons.
Firstly the energy suuply industry provides homogeneous products across different suppli-
ers. Large-scale industrial customers for example are quite sensitive to prices of the energy
they need. Although service quality for energy consulting, security and the like would be
quite important for such industrial customers, because of the product homogeneity, the price
strategy of a supplier is the key to differentiate the company from the rest and to establish
its competitiveness in the market.
A second reason to emphasize the price strategy in the energy supply industry can be
found in that the industry has been deregulated in many advanced countries since near the
end of the previous century, including the United States, EU countries and Japan. The
deregulation is intended to device a variety of ways to lower barrier for new entry and the
industry has been exposed to rapidly growing severe price competitions.
Lastly, it is important to realize that the energy supply industry still faces certain
customs for price setting which come from the public nature of the industry. Before the
deregulation in Japan, for example, it is customary to offer a common price table, called
the universal price table, to all customers at their site, provided that the total demand, and
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hourly and monthly load factors over a year are more or less the same. In addition, the
universal price table cannot be altered frequently, say at most once in a few years. Such
practices concerning the price strategy are still in effect to some extent even after the dereg-
ulation.
Structural models for analyzing competitive markets characterized by homogeneous
products and services such as the public utility can be traced back to 1920’s. The origi-
nal paper by Hotelling [5] deals with the duopoly situation where two suppliers compete
over customers uniformly distributed on a finite line by choosing their locations and prices.
D’Aspremont et al. [2] show non-existence of Nash equilibrium unless the two suppliers are
located relatively far apart. Economides [3] extended the Hotelling model by introducing
customers uniformly distributed on a plane. Anderson [1] incorporates stackelberg leader-
ship within the context of the Hotelling model. Other variations include Thisse and Vives
[9], Zhang and Teraoka [10] and Rath [8]. Gabszewicz and Thisse [4] provide an excellent
review of the literature. More recently, for a spatially duopoly model with customers located
at different nodes having separate demand functions, Matsubayashi et al. [7] establish a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium and develop com-
putational algorithms for finding the equilibrium point.
The literature dicussed above focuses on pure strategies and analysis for mixed strate-
gies has been largely ignored, to the best knowledge of the authors. Since the universal
price table is still in effect to some extent and cannot be altered easily once they are set for
a certain period even after the deregulation in Japan, it is of crucial importance to consider
mixed strategies by reading the price strategies of competitors at the time of bidding. This
means that the role of mixed strategies has been increasing its importance in analyzing the
energy supply industry.
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by developing a duopoly model with two
symmetric customers and to construct the Nash equilibriums explicitly when mixed strate-
gies are defined on a finite set of L discrete points that are chosen in such a way that their
reciprocals are equally distanced in a finite interval. The limiting strategies as L → ∞
are also derived explicitly. It is shown that these limiting strategies are Nash equilibriums
within the context of mixed strategies defined on continuum.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Secion 2, a duopoly model with two sym-
metric customers is introduced and a game-theoretic framework is described formally. By
choosing discrete pricing points in a peculiar way, the Nash equilibriums are constructed
explicitly in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to analyze the limiting behavior of the strategies
derived in Section 3 as L→∞. In the last section, numerical examples are presented.
2. Model Description
We consider a market consisting of two suppliers and two customers, where each supplier
provides a homogeneous service such as propane gas or natural gas transported by LNG
tank lorry for industrial use. Each customer may represent one large industry or a group of
residents in the same district. For convenience, the near customer of supplier i is defined as
customer i and the distant customer as customer 3 − i, i = 1, 2 as depicted in Figure 2.1.
The market is assumed to be symmetric in that a) both suppliers have the same costs chigh
and clow for providing service to the distant customer and the near customer respectively
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Figure 2.1: Two Supplier Two Customer Model
where clow < chigh; b) both customers have the same demand D ; and c) each supplier has to
offer a uniform price upon delivery to both of the two customers despite the cost difference.
Each supplier provides its service only when it results in a positive return to do so and
each customer chooses the supplier which offers the lower price. When the two suppliers
happen to offer the same price to a customer, the demand of the customer is split evenly
between the two suppliers. Since the service under consideration is typically an energy
supply service, it is also natural to assume that there exists a price upper bound. It should
be noted that, if clow < πi ≤ chigh, supplier i monopolizes its near customer and the price
can be increased to chigh without losing its monopoly of the near customer. Accordingly,
one has πi ∈ I = [chigh, U ] for i = 1, 2 where πi is the uniform price offered by supplier i.
In what follows, we describe a general game structure defined on the strategy set I .
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and let RV be a set of random variables defined on
(Ω,F , P ) with full support on I = [chigh, U ]. More specifically, for AX(α) = {ω|X(ω) ≤ α},
we define RV = {X|X : Ω → R, AX(α) ∈ F for ∀α ∈ R} where R is the set of real
numbers. It should be noted that, for anyA ⊂ R, we write P [X ∈ A] =
∫
ω∈Ω
δ{X(ω)∈A}P (dω)
where δ{X(ω)∈A} = 1 if X(ω) ∈ A and 0 else. In particular, it should be noted that P [X ∈
I ] = 1. A mixed strategy of supplier i then corresponds to a random variable Xi ∈ RV .
Throughout the paper we assume that each supplier decides its strategy independently of
the other so that X1 and X2 are independent, and each supplier has enough production
capacity to meet customers’ demands.
Given π1 = X1(ω1) and π2 = X2(ω2) for some ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω, it can be readily seen that
the payoff function of supplier i is given by
hi(π1, π2) =


2(πi − cmid)D if πi < π3−i, πi, π3−i ∈ (chigh, U ]
(πi − cmid)D if πi = π3−i, πi, π3−i ∈ (chigh, U ]
0 if πi > π3−i, πi, π3−i ∈ (chigh, U ]
(chigh − clow)D if πi = chigh, π3−i ∈ (chigh, U ]
(πi − clow)D if πi ∈ (chigh, U ], π3−i = chigh ,
(2.1)
where cmid
def
= (clow + chigh)/2 .
If chigh < πi < π3−i ≤ U , supplier i can monopolize the entire market with demand 2D
at the average earning per unit of πi − cmid. When chigh < πi = π3−i ≤ U , the demand
D of each customer is split evenly between the two suppliers and the average earning per
unit is again πi − cmid. The case that chigh < π3−i < πi ≤ U is the opposite of the
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first case and the competitor of supplier i monopolizes the entire market. For the case of
chigh = πi < π3−i ≤ U , supplier i can not produce a positive profit from the distant customer
and therefore captures only the near customer with average earning per unit of chigh− clow.
Finally, if chigh = π3−i < πi ≤ u, supplier i is forced to settle for the near customer with the
average earning per unit of πi − clow .
Let Si be the strategy set of supplier i and define S = S1 × S2. In our model, one has
S1 = S2 = RV so that S = RV × RV . Given (X1, X2) ∈ S, let Vi(X1, X2) = E[hi(X1, X2)]
be the expected payoff function of supplier i. More specifically, we define
Vi(X1, X2) =
∫ ∫
ω1∈Ω ω2∈Ω
hi(X1(ω1), X2(ω2))P (dω1)P (dω2), i = 1, 2. (2.2)
The following conventional notion in game theory is employed.
Definition 2.1
a) For i = 1, 2,X∗i is a best reply against X3−i if V1(X
∗
1 , X2) = maxX1∈RV [V1(X1, X2)] for
i = 1 and V2(X1, X
∗
2 ) = maxX2∈RV [V2(X1, X2)] for i = 2.
b) For i = 1, 2, Bi(X3−i) = {X∗i : X
∗
i is a best reply against X3−i} is called the set of best
replies of supplier i against X3−i.
c)The best reply correspondence B : S → S is defined as B(X1, X2) = B1(X2)×B2(X1).
d)(X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium, denoted by (X
∗
1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ NE ,
if and only if (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ B(X
∗
1 , X
∗
2).
In the following sections we derive two types of Nash equilibriums for mixed strategies
explicitly. Fisrt we focus on discrete random variables in RV when the discrete support
points are chosen in such a way that their reciprocals are separated by equal distance, and
two types of Nash equilibriums for the descretized game are constructed explicitly. It is
shown that the sequence of each type of Nash equilibriums converges in law to a mixed
strategy in S as the equal distance diminishes to 0. Furthermore, it can be shown that the
limiting mixed strategies are also the Nash equilibriums for the original game defined on
continuum. It may be worthwhile to note that the number of Nash euilibriums is odd for
alomst all bimatrix games as demonstrated in Lemke [6].
3. Nash Equilibriums with Specific Discrete Support
In this section, we provide a constructive proof for the existence of Nash equilibriums by
discretizing the game defined in Secion 2. Let a = [a1, · · · , aL]T ∈ RL be such that
a1 = (chigh − cmid)D ; (3.1)
1
am
= (L−m)∆ +
1
aL
, m ∈ L \ {1} ; and (3.2)
aL = (U − cmid)D , (3.3)
where K =
1
a1
−
1
aL
, ∆ =
K
L− 3
2
. (3.4)
It should be noted that a is constructed in such a way that
1
am
−
1
am+1
= ∆ , m ∈ L \ {1, L} ;
1
a1
−
1
a2
=
1
2
∆ . (3.5)
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We now define vL = [v1, · · · , vL] ∈ R
L in terms of a as
vL =
1
D
a+ cmid1L , (3.6)
where 1m is the m-dimensional vector whose components are all 1. We note that v1 = chigh <
v2 < v3 < · · · vL−1 < vL = U . Let DRV (vL) be a set of discrete random variables with full
support on {v1, · · · , vL}, where X ∈ DRV (vL) is represented by a probability vector q with
P [X = vm] = qm, m ∈ L = {1, 2, 3 · · · , L}, and we write X ∈ DRV (vL) or q ∈ DRV (vL)
interchangeably.
In this section, we focus on discrete mixed strategies in S(vL) = DRV (vL)×DRV (vL),
where Definition 2.1 should be rewritten with RV replaced by DRV (vL). The decom-
position of the interval [chigh, U ] by vL is rather peculiar as depicted in Figure 3.1. Let
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Figure 3.1: vL with L=8
H
i
= [hi(vm, vn)]m,n∈L, i = 1, 2 with hi(vm, vn) as given in (2.1). From (2.2), one sees that
Vi(q1, q2) = q
T
1
H
i
q
2
, i = 1, 2 . From the symmetric structure of (2.1), it can be seen that
h1(π1, π2) = h2(π2, π1) so that H2 = H
T
1
. It then follows that V2(q1, q2) = q
T
1
H
2
q
2
=
qT
2
HT
2
q
1
= qT
2
H
1
q
1
. Hence, it is possible to define Vi(q1, q2) as
Vi(q1, q2) = q
T
i
H q
3−i
for i = 1, 2 where H
def
= [h1(vm, vn)]m,n∈L = H1 . (3.7)
In what follows, we show in a constructive manner that there exist two types of Nash
equilibriums (q∗
1
, q∗
2
), (q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
) ∈ NE(vL) where the two suppliers offer the same price with
the same expected profit value in the former case (i.e. q∗
1
= q∗
2
), while they offer different
prices but have the same expected profit value in the latter case (i.e. q∗∗
1
6= q∗∗
2
). We first
construct q∗ satisfying q∗
1
= q∗
2
= q∗ and (q∗
1
, q∗
2
) ∈ NE(vL). A few preliminary lemmas are
needed and proofs are given in Appendix.
Lemma 3.1 Let ∆ be as in (3.4) and define q∗T = [α1, α21
T
L−1] ∈ R
L where
α1 =
2a1
C1
(
2
aL
−∆) , α2 =
2a1
C1
∆ , and C1 = 2(
a1
aL
+ 1)− a1∆ . (3.8)
If L > max(2, aL
2a1
+ 1), then q∗ > 0 and q∗T 1L = 1.
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Lemma 3.2 Let α1, α2 and C1 be as in Lemma 3.1. Then one has
a) 2α2 + a1(α1 − 2)∆ = 0 ; and
b) α2 + a1(α1 − 2)
1
aL
+ α1 = 0 .
For notational convenience, the following matrices are introduced. We note that δ{ST } =
1 if the statement ST holds and δ{ST } = 0 else.
I = [δ{m=n}]m,n∈L\{L} ∈ R
(L−1)×(L−1) (3.9)
A
D
= [δ{m=n}am+1]m,n∈L\{L} ∈ R
(L−1)×(L−1) (3.10)
L = [δ{m<n}]m,n∈L\{L} ∈ R
(L−1)×(L−1) (3.11)
L
1
= [δ{m+1=n}]m,n∈L\{L} ∈ R
(L−1)×(L−1) (3.12)
B = I + L ∈ R(L−1)×(L−1) (3.13)
C = I + 2L ∈ R(L−1)×(L−1) (3.14)
eˆm ∈ R
L−1 and em ∈ R
L are the m-th unit vectors in RL−1 and RL respectively
w(x, y) = x1L−1 + (y − x)eˆL−1 ∈ R
(L−1) (3.15)
Lemma 3.3 Let A
D
and B be as in (3.10) and (3.13) respectively. Then one has
a) B−1A−1
D
1L−1 = w(∆,
1
aL
) ; and
b) B−1C 1L−1 = w(2, 1) .
Lemma 3.4 Let H be as in (3.7) and define vTL = [v1, · · · , vL] as in (3.6). Then the
following statements hold true.
a) [H]1,m = 2a1 for m ∈ L
b) [H ]n,1 = a1 + an for n ∈ L \ {1}
c) [H]m,n = [ADC]m−1,n−1 for m, n ∈ L \ {1}
d) H =
[
2a1 2a11
T
L−1
(a1I + AD)1L−1 ADC
]
e) H
[
x
y1L−1
]
=
[
2a1
(yA
D
C + xa1I + xAD)1L−1
]
where 0 < x < 1, and y = (1− x)/(L− 1)
The main theorem of this section can now be proven.
Theorem 3.5 Let αi(i = 1, 2) be as in (3.8) and define q
∗
1
= q∗
2
= q∗ where q∗T =
[α1, α21
T
L−1]. If L > max{2,
aL
2a1
+ 1}, then (q∗
1
, q∗
2
) ∈ NE(vL). Furthermore, the payoff
values of the two suppliers are equal with V1(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) = V2(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) = D(chigh − clow).
Proof: From Lemma 3.1, one sees that q∗ ∈ DRV (vL). In order to prove (q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) ∈ NE(vL),
from (3.7), all we need to show is that V1(em, q
∗
2
) ≤ V1(q∗1, q
∗
2
) and V2(q
∗
1
, em) ≤ V2(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) hold
for all m ∈ L . From (3.15), one sees that w(x, y) is linear in (x, y). Lemma 3.2 then implies
that α2w(2, 1)+a1(α1−2)w(∆,
1
aL
)+α1w(0, 1) = w
[
2α2+a1(α1−2)∆, α2+a1(α1−2)
1
aL
+
6
α1
]
= w(0, 0) = 0. With w(2, 1) and w(∆, 1
aL
) in the above equation substituted by Lemma
3.3 a) and b) respectively, one sees that α2B
−1C 1L−1+a1(α1−2)B
−1A−1
D
1L−1+α1w(0, 1) =
0 . Multiplying A
D
B from left, this then leads to
α2ADBB
−1C 1L−1 + a1(α1 − 2)1L−1 + α1ADB w(0, 1) = 0 ,
i.e. [
α2ADC + a1α1I + α1AD
]
1L−1 = 2a11L−1 , (3.16)
where B w(0, 1) = 1L−1 is employed to yield (3.16). On the other hand, from Lemma 3.4
d), one sees that H q∗ =
[
2a1
(α2ADC + α1a1I + α1AD)1L−1
]
. It then follows from this and
(3.16) that H q∗ = 2a11L. This in turn implies that V1(em, q
∗
2
) = 2a1 = V1(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) and
V2(q
∗
1
, em) = 2a1 = V2(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) hold for all m ∈ L, completing the proof. 2
The above theorem states that a Nash equilibrium can be achieved when the two
suppliers offer the same mixed strategy q∗T = [α1, α21
T
L−1] ∈ DRV (vL). As can be seen
from (3.4), ∆ decreases as L increases. One then sees from (3.8) that α1 is much larger than
α2 for large values of L. In this case, the two suppliers tend to protect the near customer by
assigning a higher probability of α1 to v1 = chigh. At the same time, it is crucial to allocate a
small but positive probability α2 to all other price alternatives so that (q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) ∈ NE(vL) can
be assured. Somewhat surprisingly, we next show that there exists a different type of Nash
equilibrium (q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
) ∈ NE(vL), where the two suppliers take different mixed strategies (i.e.
q∗∗
1
6= q∗∗
2
) but share almost the same expected payoff, and one of the two player’s payoff
is the same as that of Theorem 3.5. As before, a few preliminary lemmas are needed and
proofs are given in Appendix.
Lemma 3.6 Let α3 and α4 be defined by
α3 =
2
aL
1
a1
+ 1
aL
, and α4 =
2∆
1
a1
+ 1
aL
. (3.17)
Then one has a)α3 = a1(2− α3)
1
aL
and b)α4 = a1(2− α3)∆ .
In what follows, the matrices in (3.9) through (3.14) are employed.
Lemma 3.7 Let H be as in (3.7) and define vL as in (3.6). We also define f ∈ R
L−1
as (f)m = {1 + (−1)m}/2,m ∈ L \ {L}. If L is even, then for any 0 < x < 1 and
y = 2(1− x)/(L− 2), one has
H
[
x
yf
]
=
[
2a1
yA
D
C f + xa11 + xAD1
]
.
Lemma 3.8 Let H, vL and w(x, y) be as in (3.7),(3.6) and (3.15) respectively. Then for
any 0 < y < 1 and x = (1− y)/(L− 2), one has
H
[
0
w(x, y)
]
=
[
2a1
A
D
C w(x, y)
]
.
Lemma 3.9 Let f be as in Lemma 3.7. If L is even, then one has a) B−1C f = w(1, 0)
and b) B−11 = w(0, 1).
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We are now in a position to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.10 Let α3 and α4 be as in Lemma 3.6. For f ∈ RL−1 given in Lemma 3.7, we
define (q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
) as q∗∗
i
= q♯ , q∗∗
3−i
= q† where
q♯ T =
4
4− α4
[α3, α4f
T ] , q†T = [0, wT (α5, α6)] ,
α5 = a1∆ and α6 = a1(
1
aL
+
∆
2
) . (3.18)
If L is even and L > max(2, aL
2a1
+ 1), then (q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
) ∈ NE(vL). The payoff values of the
two suppliers at this equilibrium are given as Vi(q
∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
) = D(chigh − clow), V3−i(q∗∗1 , q
∗∗
2
) =
4
4−α4
D(chigh − clow), i = 1, 2 .
Proof: Without loss of generality we assume i = 1. First we show that q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
∈ DRV (vL).
It can be seen from (3.17) that α3 +
L−2
2
α4 = (α3 +
L−3
2
2
α4) −
1
4
α4 = 1 −
1
4
α4, so that
q∗∗T
1
1L =
4
4−α4
(α3 + α4f
T 1L−1) =
1
1− 1
4
α4
(α3 +
L−2
2
α4) = 1. From (3.15) and the definition of
q∗∗
2
, one sees that q∗∗T
2
1L = w
T (α5, α6)1L−1 = (L − 1)α5 + (α6 − α5) = (L − 2)α5 + α6 . It
then follows from (3.4) and (3.18) that q∗∗T
2
1L = (L−
3
2
)a1∆+
a1
aL
= ( 1
a1
− 1
aL
)a1 +
a1
aL
= 1 .
One sees from (3.4), (3.17) and the condition L > max{2, aL
2a1
+ 1} that
α4 =
2∆
1
a1
+ 1
aL
=
2
L− 3
2
aL − a1
aL + a1
<
2
aL
2a1
+ 1− 3
2
aL − a1
aL + a1
=
4a1
aL − a1
aL − a1
aL + a1
= 4
1
1 + aL
a1
< 4 .
Hence q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
≥ 0 and q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
∈ DRV (vL). We next show that V1(em, q
∗∗
2
) ≤ V1(q∗∗1 , q
∗∗
2
)
and V2(q
∗∗
1
, em) ≤ V2(q
∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
) hold for allm ∈ L . From Lemma 3.9 together with (3.15), one
easily sees that α4B
−1C f + α3B
−11L−1 = α4w(1, 0) + α3w(0, 1) = w(α4, α3) . By Lemma
3.6 this then leads to
α4B
−1C f + α3B
−11L−1 = a1(2− α3)w(∆,
1
aL
) = a1(2− α3)B
−1A−1
D
1L−1 ,
where Lemma 3.3 a) is employed to yield the last equality. By multiplying A
D
B from left
to the above equation, it follows that α4ADC f +α3AD 1L−1 = a1(2−α3)1L−1, and one has
α4ADC f + α3AD1L−1 + α3a11L−1 = 2a11L−1 . (3.19)
Let x = 4α3
4−α4
and y = 4α4
4−α4
. One sees that (L − 2)(4 − α4)y = (L −
3
2
− 1
2
)4 2∆1
a1
+ 1
aL
=
8
1
a1
− 1
aL
1
a1
+ 1
aL
−2 2∆1
a1
+ 1
aL
= 8−8
2
aL
1
a1
+ 1
aL
−2α4 = 8−8α3−2α4 = 2(4−α4)(1−x), so that y =
2(1−x)
L−2
.
Since qT ∗∗
1
∈ DRV (vL) and the first component of q
T ∗∗
1
is x, one has 0 < x < 1. Applying
these x and y to Lemma 3.7 and using (3.19), one sees that H q∗∗
1
=
[
2a1
4
4−α4
2a11L−1
]
. This
in turn implies that V2(q
∗∗
1
, em) = emH q
∗∗
1
≤ 4
4−α4
2a1 = V2(q
∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
) for all m ∈ L .
We also need to show V1(em, q
∗∗
2
) ≤ V1(q∗∗1 , q
∗∗
2
) for all m ∈ L. From (3.18) together with
(3.15), one sees that
α5w(2, 1) + w(0, 2(α6 − α5)) = w(2α5, 2α6 − α5) = 2a1w(∆,
1
aL
) . (3.20)
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Since B−1(C + I) = (I + L)−1(I + 2L + I) = 2I, Lemma 3.3 a) b) and (3.20) lead to
α5B
−1C 1L−1 +B
−1 (C + I)w(0, α6 − α5) = 2a1B
−1A−1
D
1L−1 . (3.21)
Multiplying A
D
B from left in (3.21), one obtains α5ADC 1L−1+AD (C+I)w(0, α6−α5) =
2a11L−1 . From the linearity of w(x, y) in (3.15) and (3.10), this then leads to
A
D
C w(α5, α6) + w(0, aL(α6 − α5))
= A
D
C w(α5, α5) + AD C w(0, α6 − α5) + w(0, aL(α6 − α5))
= A
D
C w(α5, α5) + AD C w(0, α6 − α5) + AD w(0, (α6 − α5))
= α5ADC 1L−1 + AD (C + I)w(0, α6 − α5) = 2a11L−1 ,
that is,
A
D
C w(α5, α6) = 2a11L−1 − w(0, aL(α6 − α5)) . (3.22)
Let x = α5 and y = α6 so that x(L−2) = a1∆(L−2) = a1∆(L−
3
2
− 1
2
) = (1− a1
aL
)−a1
∆
2
=
1−α6 = 1− y, and therefore x = (1− y)/(L− 2). From (3.18) with (3.4) and the condition
L > 2, one has
y = α6 = a1(
1
aL
+
∆
2
) =
a1
aL
+
a1
2
1
a1
− 1
aL
L− 3
2
<
a1
aL
+
1− a1
aL
2(2− 3
2
)
= 1 .
Hence with x and y above, Lemma 3.8 can be applied, yielding
H q∗∗
2
= H
[
0
w(α5, α6)
]
=
[
2a1
A
D
C w(α5, α6)
]
=
[
2a1
2a11L−1 −w(0, aL(α6 − α5))
]
.
It should be noted that from the condition L >
aL
2a1
+ 1, one has α6 − α5 =
a1
aL
− a1∆
2
=
a1
aL
−
1−
a1
aL
2(L− 3
2
)
> a1
aL
−
1−
a1
aL
2(
aL
2a1
+1−3
2
)
= a1
aL
−
1−
a1
aL
aL
a1
−1
= 0, so that V1(em, q
∗∗
2
) ≤ 2a1 = V1(q∗∗1 , q
∗∗
2
) for
all m ∈ L, where (q∗∗
1
)L = 0 if L is even is employed to yield the last equality. 2
It should be noted that Theorem 3.10 proves the exixtence of two equilibriums (q♯, q†) and
(q†, q♯). The former one can be written as q∗∗
1
(= q♯) = 4
4−α4
[
α3, α4f
T
]T
and q∗∗
2
(= q†) =
[0, α5, · · · , α5, α6]
T while those in Theorem 3.5 are q∗
1
= q∗
2
(= q∗) =
[
α1, α21
T
L−1
]T
. As we will
see, one has limL→∞ q
∗ = limL→∞ q
♯, while limL→∞ q
† is quite different. The supplier with
q∗∗
1
(= q♯) is risk-aversive with tendency to protect the near customer by offering lower prices
with higher probabilities, while the supplier with q∗∗
2
(= q†) is risk-taking, by offering higher
prices with higher probabilities. It may be worthwhile to note that we have constructed
the three Nash equilibriums (q∗, q∗), (q♯, q†) and (q†, q♯), which is consistent with the result
of Lemke [6] that the number of Nash equilibriums of the nondegenerate bimatrix game is
odd.
4. Limit Theorems of Nash Equilibriums with Specific Discrete Support
In the previous section, three Nash equilibriums (q∗, q∗), (q♯, q†) and (q†, q♯) are constructed
explicitly, when the strategy set consists of L discrete supporting points for pricing with
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vL = [vL:1, · · · , vL:L] as given in (3.6), where we write each compenent of vL as [vL:1, · · · , vL:L]
instead of [v1, · · · , vL] throughout this section to emphasize the demesion of vL. While vL
partitions the strategy set I = [chigh, U ] of the original problem in a rather peculiar way
as shown in Figure 3.1, the set {vL : L = L0, L0 + 1, · · · } with L0 > 2 becomes dense in
I = [chigh, U ]. Let X
∗
L,X
♯
L and X
†
L be discrete random variables associated with q
∗,q♯ and q†
respectively. It is then of interest to see whether or not (X∗L, X
∗
L), (X
♯
L, X
†
L) and (X
†
L, X
♯
L)
in S(vL) = DRV (vL)×DRV (vL) converge to any mixed strategies (X
∗, X∗), (X♯, X†) and
(X†, X♯) in S = RV × RV of the original problem as L→∞ and those limiting strategies
are again Nash equilibriums.
In order to understand such limiting behaviors, we give a preliminary lemma where a
proof is provided in Appendix. With the assumption that L is even, L˜
def
= L/2 is a natural
number. In the remaider of this section we wtire L˜→ ∞ instead of L→∞ to clarify that
L moves toward infinity in a set of even numbers.
Lemma 4.1 Let F ∗∞(x) be a distribution function defined on [chigh, U ] given by
F ∗∞(x) = α1:∞ +
(1− α1:∞)
KD
(
1
chigh − cmid
−
1
x− cmid
)
, (4.1)
with α1:∞ = limL˜→∞ α1(=
2a1
a1+aL
) , and define r∗L:m
def
=
∑m
m′=1 q
∗
L:m′ where q
∗ = [q∗L:1, · · · , q
∗
L:L]
T
is as in Theorem 3.5. Then one has
a) F ∗∞(vL:m) < r
∗
L:m+1 , m = 1, · · · , L − 1 , and
b) r∗L:m < F
∗
∞(vL:m) , m = 1, · · ·L − 1 .
Theorem 4.2 Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space where Ω = (0, 1], F is a Borel field on
Ω = (0, 1] and P is the one-dimensional uniform probability measure on (Ω,F), and define
{Ω∗L:m}, m ∈ L as a partition of Ω given by
Ω∗L:1 = (0 , r
∗
L:1 ] ; and
Ω∗L:m =
(
r∗L:m−1 , r
∗
L:m
]
, m = 2, · · · , L . (4.2)
We also define random variables X∗(ω) ∈ RV and X∗L(ω) ∈ DRV (vL) on (Ω,F , P ) as
X∗L(ω) = vL:m if ω ∈ Ω
∗
L:m , m = 1, 2, · · · , L
X∗(ω) =
{
vL:1 if ω ∈ (0 , α1:∞]
F ∗−1∞ (ω) if ω ∈ (α1:∞ , 1]
.
Then the following statements hold.
1) F ∗∞(x) is the distribution function of X
∗(ω)
2) q∗ is the probability vector of X∗L(ω) where q
∗is as in Theorem 3.5
3) X∗L(ω)
a.e.
→ X∗(ω) as L˜→∞
where “
a.e.
→ ” denotes the almost everywhere convergence.
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Proof: From the definition ofX∗(ω), one has P [X∗(ω) ≤ x] = P [ω ∈ (0, α1:∞]∨(α1:∞ < ω ≤
F ∗∞(x))] = P [0 < ω ≤ F
∗
∞(x)] . Since P is the one-dimensional uniform probability measure
on (Ω,F), one has P [0 < ω ≤ F ∗∞(x)] = F
∗
∞(x), proving 1). For part 2), from the definition
of X∗L(ω), one has P [X
∗
L(ω) = vL:m] = P [ω ∈ Ω
∗
L:m] = P [r
∗
L:m−1 < ω ≤ r
∗
L:m] = q
∗
L:m . In
order to prove part 3), we consider the following four cases:
Case1: ω ∈ Ω∗L:1
From the definition of X∗L(ω) one has X
∗
L(ω) = vL:1 . From lemma 4.1 b), one has r
∗
L:1 <
F ∗∞(vL:1) = α1:∞ so that Ω
∗
L:1 ⊂ (0, α1:∞] . Then from the definition of X
∗(ω), it is clear that
X∗(ω) = vL:1 = X
∗
L(ω) .
Case2: ω ∈ Ω∗L:2
From the definition of X∗L(ω) one has X
∗
L(ω) = vL:2 . Since ω ∈ Ω
∗
L:2, one has ω ≤ r
∗
L:2. It
then follows from the definition of X∗(ω) that vL:1 ≤ X∗(ω) ≤ F ∗−1∞ (ω) ≤ F
∗−1
∞ (r
∗
L:2) , where
the last inequality is yielded since F ∗∞(x) is monotonically increasing. From Lemma 4.1 a),
one has F ∗−1∞ (r
∗
L:2) < vL:3 . These observations imply that |X
∗(ω)−X∗L(ω)| < |vL:3 − vL:1|.
Case3: ω ∈ Ω∗L:m, m = 3, · · · , L − 1
From the definition of X∗L(ω) one has X
∗
L(ω) = vL:m . We note from Lemma 4.1 a) that
α1:∞ = F
∗
∞(vL:1) < r
∗
L:2 and it is clear from the condition of this case that r
∗
L:2 < ω so that
α1:∞ < ω . It then follows from this and ω ∈ Ω∗L:m together with the definition of X
∗(ω) that
F ∗−1∞ (r
∗
L:m−1) < X
∗(ω) ≤ F ∗−1∞ (r
∗
L:m) . Similarly as in Case2 we have vL:m−2 < F
∗−1
∞ (r
∗
L:m−1)
and F ∗−1∞ (r
∗
L:m) < vL:m for m = 3, · · · , L − 1 . Then we obtain that |X
∗(ω) − X∗L(ω)| <
|vL:m − vL:m−2| for m = 3, · · · , L− 1 .
Case4: ω ∈ Ω∗L:L
From the definition of X∗L(ω), one has X
∗
L(ω) = vL:L . Since ω ∈ Ω
∗
L:L , it then follows
from the definition of X∗(ω) that F ∗−1∞ (r
∗
L:L−1) < X
∗(ω) ≤ F ∗−1∞ (r
∗
L:L) = vL:L = U . From
Lemma 4.1 a) , we have vL:L−2 < F
∗−1
∞ (r
∗
L:L−1) . Then we obtain that |X
∗(ω) − X∗L(ω)| <
|vL:L − vL:L−2|.
Since |vL:m+1−vL:m−1| < |vL:L−vL:L−2| for all m = 2, · · · , L−1 , one has that |X∗(ω)−
X∗L(ω)| < |vL:L − vL:L−2| for all ω ∈ Ω. Since |vL:L − vL:L−2| → 0 as L˜→∞, it then follows
for all ω ∈ Ω that X∗L(ω)→ X
∗(ω) as L˜→∞ . 2
A similar theorem can be shown concerning the limiting behavior of X†L in Theorem 3.10
when L˜→∞ . As before a preliminary lemma is needed and a proof is given in Appendix.
Lemma 4.3 Let F †∞(x) be a distribution function defined on [chigh, U ]given by
F †∞(x) =


(1− α6:∞)
KD
(
1
chigh − cmid
−
1
x− cmid
)
if chigh ≤ x < U
1 if x = U
, (4.3)
where α6:∞
def
= limL˜→∞ α6(=
a1
aL
) and define r♯L:m and r
†
L:m as r
♯
L:m =
∑m
m′=1 q
♯
L:m′ and r
†
L:m =∑m
m′=1 q
†
L:m′ where q
† = [q†L:1, · · · , q
†
L:L]
T and q♯ = [q♯L:1, · · · , q
♯
L:L]
Tare as in Theorem 3.10.
As before we assume that L is even. Then one has
a) F ∗∞(vL:m) < r
♯
L:m , m = 1, 3, 5, · · · , L− 1 ;
b) r♯L:m < F
∗
∞(vL:m+2) , m = 1, 3, 5, · · · , L− 3 ;
c) F †∞(vL:m) < r
†
L:m , m = 1, 2, 3, · · · , L− 1 ; and
d) r†L:m < F
†
∞(vL:m+2) , m = 1, 2, 3, · · · , L− 3 .
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Theorem 4.4 Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space as in Theorem 4.2, and define {Ω♯L:m}
and {Ω†L:m} for m ∈ L as partitions of Ω . More specifically we define {Ω
♯
L:m} and {Ω
†
L:m}
as
Ω♯L:1 = (0 , r
♯
L:1 ] ,
Ω♯L:m =
(
r♯L:m−1 , r
♯
L:m
]
m = 2, · · · , L ; and
Ω†L:1 = (0 , r
†
L:1 ] ,
Ω†L:m =
(
r†L:m−1 , r
†
L:m
]
m = 2, · · · , L ,
where r♯L:m and r
†
L:m are as in Lemma 4.3. We also define random variables X
†(ω) ∈ RV
and X♯L(ω), X
†
L(ω) ∈ DRV (vL) on (Ω,F , P ) as
X♯L(ω) = vL:m if ω ∈ Ω
♯
L:m , m = 1, 2, · · · , L
X†L(ω) = vL:m if ω ∈ Ω
†
L:m , m = 1, 2, · · · , L
X†(ω) =
{
F †−1∞ (ω) if ω ∈ (0 , 1− α6:∞]
vL:L if ω ∈ (1− α6:∞ , 1]
.
Then, with notation of Theorem 3.10, one has
1) F †∞(x) is the distribution function of X
†(ω) ;
2) q♯ is the probability vector of X♯L(ω) ;
3) q† is the probability vector of X†L(ω) ;
4) X♯L(ω)
a.e.
→ X∗(ω) as L˜→∞ ; and
5) X†L(ω)
a.e.
→ X†(ω) as L˜→∞ .
Proof: 1),2) and 3) can be proven similarly to Theorem 4.2. In order to prove part 4), we
consider the following cases:
Case1: ω ∈ Ω♯L:1 ∪ Ω
♯
L:2
From the definition of X∗(ω), one has either X∗(ω) = vL:1(= chigh ≤ F ∗−1∞ (ω)) or X
∗(ω) =
F ∗−1∞ (ω) so that X
∗(ω) ≤ F ∗−1∞ (ω). Since ω ≤ r
♯
L:2 and F
∗
∞(x) is monotonically increasing,
one has F ∗−1∞ (ω) ≤ F
∗−1
∞ (r
♯
L:2) . It then follows that
X∗(ω) ≤ F ∗−1∞ (r
♯
L:2) . (4.4)
From Lemma 4.3 b), one has r♯L:3 < F
∗
∞(vL:5) so that F
∗−1
∞ (r
♯
L:3) < vL:5 . Since F
∗−1
∞ (r
♯
L:2) <
F ∗−1∞ (r
♯
L:3), this and (4.4) imply that X
∗(ω) < vL:5 . It is clear from the definition of X
∗(ω)
that vL:1 ≤ X∗(ω). These observations imply
vL:1 ≤ X
∗(ω) < vL:5 . (4.5)
From the definition of X♯L(ω), one has vL:1 ≤ X
♯
L(ω) ≤ vL:2. This together with (4.5) leads
to
|X∗(ω) −X♯L(ω)| ≤ |vL:5 − vL:1| . (4.6)
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Case2: ω ∈ Ω♯L:m and m = 4, 6, 8, · · · , L− 4 .
From the definition of F ∗∞(x), one has α1:∞ = F
∗
∞(vL:1) < F
∗
∞(vL:3). Since Lemma 4.3 a)
implies F ∗∞(vL:3) < r
♯
L:3 , one has α1:∞ < r
♯
L:3 and consequently α1:∞ < ω . Hence from the
definition of X∗(ω), one has X∗(ω) = F ∗−1∞ (ω). Since r
♯
L:m−1 < ω ≤ r
♯
L:m , it then follows
that
F ∗−1∞ (r
♯
L:m−1) < F
∗−1
∞ (ω) = X
∗(ω) ≤ F ∗−1∞ (r
♯
L:m) . (4.7)
From Lemma 4.3 a), one has vL:m−1 < F
∗−1
∞ (r
♯
L:m−1) for m = 4, 6, 8, · · · , L− 4 . From this
and (4.7), it can be seen that
vL:m−1 < F
∗−1(r♯L:m−1) < X
∗(ω) for m = 4, 6, · · · , L− 4 . (4.8)
From Lemma 4.3 b), one has F ∗−1∞ (r
♯
L:m+1) < vL:m+3 for m = 4, 6, · · · , L − 4 . It then
follows from this and (4.7) that
X∗(ω) ≤ F ∗−1∞ (r
♯
L:m) < F
∗−1
∞ (r
♯
L:m+1) < vL:m+3 for m = 4, 6, · · · , L− 4 . (4.9)
From the definition of X♯L(ω), it is clear that X
♯
L(ω) = vL:m . This together with (4.8) and
(4.9), one has
|X∗(ω)−X♯L(ω)| ≤ |vL:m+3 − vL:m−1| for all m = 4, 6, · · · , L− 4 . (4.10)
Case3: ω ∈ Ω♯L:m and m = 3, 5, 7, · · · , L− 3 .
From the definition of r♯L:m and q
♯
L:m one has q
♯
L:m = 0,m = 3, 5, 7, · · · , L−3 so that Ω
♯
L:m = ø
for m = 3, 5, 7, · · · , L− 3.
Case4: ω ∈ Ω♯L:L−2 ∪ Ω
♯
L:L−1 ∪ Ω
♯
L:L .
Since r♯L:L−3 < ω, one has F
∗−1
∞ (r
♯
L:L−3) ≤ F
∗−1
∞ (ω)(= X
∗(ω)) . From Lemma 4.3 a), it can
be seen that vL:L−3 < F
∗−1
∞ (r
♯
L:L−3) and therefore
vL:L−3 < X
∗(ω) . (4.11)
From the condition of this case, one has
vL:L−2 ≤ X
♯
L(ω) . (4.12)
It is clear from the definition that X∗(ω), X♯L(ω) ≤ vL:L . This together with (4.11) and
(4.12) leads to
|X∗(ω)−X♯L(ω)| < |vL:L − vL:L−3| . (4.13)
From the definition of vL:m, it is clear that |vL:m − vL:m−4| < |vL:L − vL:L−4| for m =
5, 6, · · · , L . From this together with (4.6) (4.10) and (4.13), one sees, for all ω ∈ Ω,
|X∗(ω)−X♯L(ω)| < |vL:L − vL:L−4| . Since limL˜→∞ |vL:L − vL:L−4| = 0, it then follows for all
ω ∈ Ω that X♯L(ω)→ X
∗(ω) as L˜→∞ , proving part 4).
Finally we prove part 5). As before we consider the following three cases:
Case1: ω ∈ Ω†L:1 ∪ Ω
†
L:2 .
Since ω ≤ r†L:2 and F
†
∞(x) is monotonically increasing function, one has
F †−1∞ (ω) ≤ F
†−1
∞ (r
†
L:2) . (4.14)
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From the definition of r†L:m, α5 and α6:∞, one sees, for L > 2, r
†
L:2 ≤ r
†
L:L−1 = (L − 2)α5 =
(L− 2)a1∆ = a1K
L−2
L−3/2
< a1K = 1−
a1
aL
= 1− α6:∞ so that
r†L:2 ≤ r
†
L:L−1 < 1− α6:∞ . (4.15)
Hence one has r†L:2 ∈ (0, 1−α6:∞]. This with the definition of X
†(ω) then leads to X†(ω) =
F †−1∞ (ω), and therefore X
†(ω) ≤ F †−1∞ (r
†
L:2) from (4.14). Lemma 4.3 d) yields F
†−1
∞ (r
†
L:2) <
vL:4 so that X
†(ω) < vL:4. It is clear from the definition of X
†(ω) that vL:1 ≤ X†(ω). Finally,
these observations imply that
vL:1 ≤ X
†(ω) < vL:4 . (4.16)
From the definition of X†L(ω) it is clear that vL:1 ≤ X
†
L(ω) ≤ vL:2. This together with (4.16)
leads to
|X†(ω)−X†L(ω)| ≤ |vL:4 − vL:1| . (4.17)
Case2: ω ∈ Ω†L:m and m = 3, 4, 5, · · · , L− 3 .
From the condition of Case2 and (4.15), it is easily seen that ω ≤ r†L:L−3 < r
†
L:L−1 < 1−α6:∞,
so that ω ∈ (0, 1− α6:∞]. This together with the defitnition of X
†(ω) implies that X†(ω) =
F †−1∞ (ω). From the condition of Case2 one has r
†
L:m−1 < ω ≤ r
†
L:m, m = 3, 4, 5, · · · , L− 3 so
that
F †−1∞ (r
†
L:m−1) < F
†−1
∞ (ω) = X
†(ω) ≤ F †−1∞ (r
†
L:m), m = 3, 4, 5, · · · , L− 3 . (4.18)
From Lemma 4.3 c), it can be seen that
vL:m−1 < F
†−1
∞ (r
†
L:m−1), m = 3, 4, 5, · · · , L− 3 . (4.19)
From Lemmma 4.3 d) one has F †−1∞ (r
†
L:m) < vL:m+2 for m = 3, 4, 5, · · · , L − 3. From this
together with (4.18) and (4.19) one obtains
vL:m−1 < X
†(ω) < vL:m+2 , m = 3, 4, 5, · · · , L − 3 . (4.20)
From the definition of X†L(ω), it is clear that X
†
L(ω) = vL:m . This together with (4.20) leads
to
|X†(ω)−X†L(ω)| < |vL:m+2 − vL:m−1| . (4.21)
Case3: ω ∈ Ω†L:L−2 ∪ Ω
†
L:L−1 ∪ Ω
†
L:L .
Since r†L:L−3 < ω one has
F †−1∞ (r
†
L:L−3) < F
†−1
∞ (ω) . (4.22)
From the definition of X†(ω), either X†(ω) = F †−1∞ (ω) or X
†(ω) = vL:L. Since F
†−1
∞ (ω) ≤
vL:L for all ω ∈ Ω, one has F †−1∞ (ω) ≤ X
†(ω). From this and (4.22), it follows that
F †−1∞ (r
†
L:L−3) < X
†(ω). It is easily seen from Lemma 4.3 c) that vL:L−3 < F
†−1
∞ (r
†
L:L−3)
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and therefore vL:L−3 ≤ X†(ω). From the definition of X†(ω) it is clear that X†(ω) ≤ vL:L.
These observations imply that
vL:L−3 ≤ X
†(ω) ≤ vL:L . (4.23)
From the definition of X†L(ω), one sees vL:L−3 < X
†
L(ω) ≤ vL:L. This together with (4.23)
leads to
|X†(ω)−X†L(ω)| ≤ |vL:L − vL:L−3| . (4.24)
Since |vL:m−vL:m−3| ≤ |vL:L−vL:L−3| for allm = 4, 5, 6, · · · , L, from (4.17),(4.21) and (4.24),
one has |X†(ω) −X†L(ω)| ≤ |vL:L − vL:L−3| for all ω ∈ Ω. Since limL˜→∞ |vL:L − vL:L−3| = 0,
it then follows that X†L(ω)→ X
†(ω) as L˜→∞ for all ω ∈ Ω. 2
So far in this section, we have shown that the Nash equilibriums for the descretized
game converge almost everywhere to some strategies of the original game. In what follows,
we prove that these limiting strategies are also Nash equilibriums for the original game. For
this purpose, we need to deal with the limiting behavior of V1(X
∗
1,L, X
∗
2,L). In the remainder
of this section, we write X∗i,L, X
♯
i,L, X
†
i,L; and X
∗
i , X
†
i , i = 1, 2 instead of X
∗
L, X
♯
L, X
†
L; and
X∗, X† to emphasize the player of the stategies. Since hi(π1, π2) in (2.1) is not continuous
function of π1, π2, it does not, in general, hold that limL˜→∞E[hi(XL, YL)] = E[hi(X,Y )]
even if XL and YL converge almost everywhere to X and Y as L˜ → ∞. As before a
preliminary lemma is needed and a proof is provided in Appendix.
Lemma 4.5 For i = 1, 2 let Yi be any independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
random variables in RV , and define the associated pairs of i.i.d. random variables Yi,L by
Yi,L(ωi) =
{
vL:1 if ω ∈ {ωi|Y (ωi) = vL:1}
vL:m if ω ∈ {ωi|vL:m−1 < Y (ωi) ≤ vL:m} for m = 2, 3, · · · , L
,
where we write ωi instead of ω to emphasize the player. Then the following statements hold ;
a) Yi,L
a.e.
→ Yi as L˜→∞ for i = 1, 2
b) lim
L˜→∞
Vi(X
∗
1,L, X
∗
2,L) = Vi(X
∗
1 , X
∗
2 ) for i = 1, 2
c) lim
L˜→∞
V1(Y1,L, X
∗
2,L) = V1(Y1, X
∗
2 ) , lim
L˜→∞
V2(X
∗
1,L, Y2,L) = V2(X
∗
1 , Y2)
d) lim
L˜→∞
Vi(X
♯
1,L, X
†
2,L) = Vi(X
∗
1 , X
†
2) for i = 1, 2
e) lim
L˜→∞
V1(Y1,L, X
†
2,L) = V1(Y1, X
†
2) , lim
L˜→∞
V2(X
♯
1,L, Y2,L) = V2(X
∗
1 , Y2)
Theorem 4.6 Let (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ S be as in Theorem 4.2, and (X
∗
1 , X
†
2), (X
†
1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ S as in
Theroem 4.4. Then one has
a) (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ NE ; and
b) (X∗1 , X
†
2) ∈ NE , (X
†
1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ NE .
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Proof: For any Y1 ∈ S1, define Y1,L as in Lemma 4.5. Since (X∗1,L, X
∗
2,L) ∈ NE(vL), one
has V1(Y1,L, X
∗
2,L) ≤ V1(X
∗
1,L, X
∗
2,L) for L ∈ {2, 4, 6, · · · } so that limL˜→∞ V1(Y1,L, X
∗
2,L) ≤
limL˜→∞ V1(X
∗
1,L, X
∗
2,L). It then follows from Lemma 4.5 b) and c) that
V1(Y1, X
∗
2 ) ≤ V1(X
∗
1 , X
∗
2 ) for all Y1 ∈ S1 . (4.25)
Similarly one has V2(X
∗
1 , Y2) ≤ V2(X
∗
1 , X
∗
2) for all Y2 ∈ S2(= RV ). This together with (4.25)
implies that (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ NE , proving part a).
We next prove part b). Since (X♯1,L, X
†
2,L) ∈ NE(vL) one has V1(Y1,L, X
†
2,L) ≤ V1(X
♯
1,L, X
†
2,L)
for L ∈ {2, 4, 6, · · · } so that limL˜→∞ V1(Y1,L, X
†
2,L) ≤ limL˜→∞(X
♯
1,L, X
†
2,L). It then follows
from Lemma 4.5 d) and e) that V1(Y1, X
†
2) ≤ V1(X
∗
1 , X
†
2) for all Y1 ∈ S1(= RV ). Similarly
one has V2(X
∗
1 , Y2) ≤ V2(X
∗
1 , X
†
2) for all Y2 ∈ S2(= RV ), proving that (X
∗
1 , X
†
2) ∈ NE . The
fact that (X†1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ NE can be proven in a similar manner, completing the proof. 2
5. Numerical Example
In this section, numerical examples are provided, yielding managerial implications for energy
suppliers. We consider the case that two customers are middle-sized industrial cutomers,
receiving natural gas transported in LNG lorry tankers. It should be noted that, unlike
usual city gas distribution through pipeline networks, the trasportation costs are considered
to be marginal costs. Although the price and cost vary depending on the condition and
demand pattern, for the sake of convenience, we suppose here clow = 40(Yen/m3), chigh =
50(Yen/m3) and U = 60(Yen/m3). For energy supply within this price range, the demand
price elastricity is thought to be very small.
The probabilities to win only near customer or both customers are evaluated when
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Figure 5.1: Probability to win each customer when (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ S
(X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ S. In our model we asuume each player has the same cost structure. If one
player tries to secure its near customer while giving up the distance customer, it offers chigh
since each player provides its service only when it results in a positive return. In this case,
the player can capture the customer with probability one. If the player tries to capture
both customers, it must offer the price x > chigh. In this case, the probabiity to win its near
customer is below one since it could lose both customers when the other player offers the
price between chigh and x. The probability can be written as F
∗
∞(x)− F
∗
∞(chigh) where F
∗
∞
16
is as in Lemma 4.1. By substituting (3.4), (3.1) and (3.3) into this, one has
F ∗∞(x)− F
∗
∞(chigh) = 1−
1
2
chigh − clow + 2d
chigh − clow + d
(1−
chigh − clow
2x− chigh − clow
) ,
where d
def
= U −chigh. Figure 5.1 depicts the winning probablity for each customer exercising
the Nash equilibtium (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) in Theorem 4.6. Similarly we show in Figure 5.2 the pob-
ablitiy for player 1 to win both customers when the equilibrium (X∗1 , X
†
2) is realized. This
shows that the winning probability for player 1 is 0.2 when it offers the price of U . If player
2 offers the price less than U , then player 1 loses both customers. In other words, player
1 could not capture any demand unless player 2 offers U . The probality for this situation
is 0.4 . However, in this case the demand is split between them, so that player 1 captures
one half of each customer’s demand since both players offer the same price U . The above
probablity 0.2 plotted in Figure 5.2 (expressed in black dot) should be understood in this
context. It can be seen that these winning probabilities are nonincreasing as a function of
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Figure 5.2: Probability to win both customers when (X∗1 , X
†
2) ∈ S
price, i.e., the higher the offering price is, the lower the two winning probabilities are. The
monotonicity appears in such a way that at the price equilibrium for the mixed strategies,
the expected profit is the same regardless of the offering price. However, this does not mean
that the offering price is not important. It affects the winning probabilities which may be
quite important for assuming the company’s presence in the market.
It is worth noting thatX∗i , i = 1, 2 in Theorem 4.6 has the mass m(chigh) = 2a1/(a1+aL)
at chigh. Let U = chigh + d. From (3.1) and (3.2), one then sees that
m(chigh) =
chigh − clow
chigh − clow + d
. (5.1)
Adopting the lowest possible price at chigh is the risk aversive strategy in that the supplier
secures the near customer while giving up the distant customer. Equation (5.1) states that
the mass assigned to this strategy at the limit is the ratio of the unit profit expected from
the near customer under this strategy against that obtained by offering the highest possible
price U = chigh + d. Clearly, the mass m(chigh) vanishes as U → ∞ and the associated
limiting distribution becomes absolutely continuous on [chigh,∞) having the probability
density function given by
f∞:U=∞(x) =
chigh − clow
2
(x− cmid)
−2
. (5.2)
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The interpretation for Theorem 4.6 b) can be stated as supplier i takes the risk aversive
strategy by placing the mass mi(chigh) as given in (5.1), while supplier 3− i adopts the risk
taking strategy by placing the mass m3−i(U) at the highest possible price U where
m3−i(U) =
chigh − clow
chigh − clow + 2d
.
Both mi(chigh) and m3−i(U) diminish to zero as U →∞ and one observes again that both
suppliers have the same associated limiting strategy specified by (5.2). One may then ex-
pect that there exists the unique Nash equilibrium specified by (5.2) with the strategy space
S = RV ×RV where RV is the set of all random variables defined on [chigh,∞). This con-
jecture is currently under study and will be reported elsewhere.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Since L > 2, one has 0 < 2
aL
(L− 1)+ 2
a1
(L− 2) = 2( 1
aL
+ 1
a1
)(L−
3
2
) −
(
1
a1
− 1
aL
)
=
L−3
2
a1
[
2( a1
aL
+ 1) − a1∆
]
=
L−3
2
a1
C1, so that C1 > 0. Similarly, since
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L >
aL
2a1
+ 1, it can be seen that 2
aL
− ∆ = 2
aL
−
1
a1
− 1
aL
(L− 3
2
)
= 1
L−3
2
{
1
aL
(2L − 3)− 1
a1
+ 1
aL
}
=
1
L−3
2
{
2
aL
(L − 1) − 1
a1
}
= 2
aL(L−
3
2
)
(
L − 1 − aL
2a1
)
> 0. It then follows that α1 > 0 and
α2 > 0. Furthermore, one has q
∗T1L = α1 + (L − 1)α2 =
2a1
C1
{
2
aL
− ∆ + (L − 1)∆
}
=
2a1
C1
{
2
aL
− ∆
2
+ (L− 3
2
)∆
}
= 2a1
C1
{
2
aL
− ∆
2
+ 1
a1
− 1
aL
}
= 1
C1
(
2a1
aL
+ 2− a1∆
)
= 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: From the definition of ∆, α1, α2 and C1, one sees that 2α2+a1(α1−
2)∆ = 2a1
C1
[
2∆ + C1
2
{
2a1
C1
(
2
aL
− ∆
)
− 2
}
∆
]
= 2a1
C1
∆
(
2 + 2a1
aL
− a1∆ − C1
)
. Substituting
−a1∆ = C1−
2a1
aL
− 2 into the last term then yields 2a1
C1
∆
(
2+ 2a1
aL
+C1−
2a1
aL
− 2−C1
)
= 0 ,
proving a). For part b), we first note from a) and the definition of α2 that a1(α1 − 2) =
−2α2
∆
= −4α1
C1
. We also note that α1 + α2 =
2a1
C1
( 2
aL
−∆+ ∆) = 4a1
C1
1
aL
. It then follows that
α2 + a1(α1 − 2)
1
aL
+ α1 = −
4α1
C1
1
aL
+ 4α1
C1
1
aL
= 0 , completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.3: We first note that L − L
1
= L
1
L so that (I − L
1
)B = I − L
1
+
L− L
1
L = I, and hence B−1 = I − L
1
. From (3.5)(3.10) and (3.12), one then sees that
B−1A−1
D
1L−1 = (I − L1)A
−1
D
1L−1 = A
−1
D
1L−1 − L1A
−1
D
1L−1
=


1
a2
1
a3
. . .
0
0
1
aL−1
1
aL




1
1
1
...
1

−


0
0
0
0
1
a3
1
a4
. . .
1
aL
0 0 0 . . . 0




1
1
1
...
1


=


1
a2
1
a3
...
1
aL−1
1
aL

−


1
a3
1
a4
...
1
aL
0

 =


∆
∆
...
∆
1
aL

 = ∆1L−1 +
(
1
aL
−∆
)
eL−1 ,
where ∆ is as in (3.4), proving a). For part b), since B−1 = I − L
1
and (I − L
1
)L = L
1
,
it can be seen that B−1C 1L−1 = (I − L1)(I + 2L)1L−1 = {(I − L1) + (2L− 2L1L)}1L−1 =
I 1L−1 + L11L−1 = w(1, 1) + w(1, 0) = w(2, 1) where I 1L−1 = w(1, 1) and L11L−1 = w(1, 0)
are employed to yield the last eauality, proving the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3.4: In what follows, since H = H
1
as in (3.7), any reference to (2.1)
assumes i = 1. We first note from (3.1) and (3.6) that v1 =
a1
D
+ cmid =
chigh−clow
2
+
chigh+clow
2
= chigh. Hence from (2.1) and (3.1), one has [H]1,m = h1(v1, vm) = h1(chigh, vm) =
(chigh− clow)D = 2a1, proving a). For part b), one sees from (2.1) that [H]n,1 = h1(vn, v1) =
h1(vn, chigh) = (vn − clow)D. Substituting vn =
an
D
+ cmid from (3.6) into the last term and
using (3.1), we obtain (vn− clow)D = an +
chigh−clow
2
D = an + a1. In order to prove part c),
we consider the following three cases:
Case1: 1 < m < n ≤ L
For this case, one has vm < vn from (3.5) and (3.6) so that it follows from (2.1) that
[H]m,n = h(vm, vn) = 2(vm − cmid)D = 2(
am
D
+ cmid − cmid)D = 2am .
Case2: m = n ≤ L
Similarly, for m = n, one has [H]m,n = h(vm, vn) = (vm − cmid)D = am for m ∈ L \ {1}.
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Case3: L ≥ m > n > 1
In this case, one has vm > vn and from (2.1) [H]m,n = 0.
We note from (3.10) and (3.14) that
A
D
C =


a2 2a2 2a2 · · · 2a2
a3 2a3 · · · 2a3
a4 · · · 2a4
0
. . .
...
aL


and part c) follows. Part d) is immediate from a), b), and c). Finally we prove part e).
Using the result of d), one sees that
H
[
x
y1L−1
]
=
[
2a1 2a11
T
L−1
(a1I + AD)1L−1 ADC
][
x
y1L−1
]
=
[
2a1{x + y(L− 1)}
{a1xI + xAD + yADC}1L−1
]
=
[
2a1
{yA
D
C + xa1I + xAD}1L−1
]
.
Proof of Lemma 3.6: By the definition of α3 in (3.17), one sees that α3(1 +
a1
aL
) = 2 a1
aL
,
so that α3 = 2
a1
aL
− a1
aL
α3 = a1(2 − α3)
1
aL
, proving a). For part b), we first note that
2 − α3 = 2 −
2
a1
aL
1+
a1
aL
= 2
1+
a1
aL
. Hence from the definition of α4 in (3.17), one sees that
α4 = a1
2
1+
a1
aL
∆ = a1(2− α3)∆ , completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.7: From Lemma 3.4 d), one sees that
H
[
x
yf
]
=
[
2a1 2a11
T
L−1
(a1I + AD)1L−1 ADC
][
x
yf
]
=
[
2a1(x+ y
L−2
2
)
a1xI 1L−1 + xAD1L−1 + yADC f
]
=
[
2a1
yA
D
C f + a1x1L−1 + xAD1L−1
]
, completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.8: From Lemma 3.4 d), one sees that H
[
0
w(x, y)
]
=
[
2a1 2a11
T
L−1
(a1I + AD)1L−1 ADC
] [
0
w(x, y)
]
=
[
2a11
T
L−1w(x, y)
A
D
C w(x, y)
]
=
[
2a1
A
D
C w(x, y)
]
where 1TL−1w(x, y) = (L − 2)x + y = 1 is employed to yield the last equality.
Proof of Lemma 3.9: We first note that (I − L
1
)L = L
1
and B−1 = I − L
1
so that
B−1C f = (I −L
1
)(I +2L)f = (I−L
1
+2L
1
)f = (I +L
1
)f = w(1, 0), proving part a). For
part b), one sees that B−11L−1 = (I − L1)1L−1 = 1L−1 − w(1, 0) = w(0, 1), completing the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.1: From (3.6) and the definition of r∗L:m, q
∗
L:m and F
∗
∞(x), one has
F ∗∞(vL:m) − r
∗
L:m+1 = {α1:∞ +
1−α1:∞
K
( 1
a1
− 1
am
)} − {α1 + mα2} = α1:∞ − α1 +
1−α1:∞
K
( 1
a1
−
1
am
)−mα2 =
∆
2
K′+K
K′(K′−∆
2
)
+ ∆
K′
(m− 3
2
)− ∆
K′−∆
2
m = ∆
2
1
K′(K′−∆
2
)
1
L−3
2
{K(L−m)−2K ′(L− 3
2
)} =
∆
2
1
K′(K′−∆
2
)
1
L−3
2
{− 1
a1
(L+m− 3)− 1
aL
(3L−m− 3)} < 0 for m = 1, · · · , L− 1, where K ′
def
=
1
a1
+ 1
aL
, proving a). One also has F ∗∞(vL:m)−r
∗
L:m =
∆
2
K′+K
K′(K′−∆
2
)
+ ∆
K′
(m− 3
2
)− ∆
K′−∆
2
(m−1) =
∆
2
K
K′(K′−∆
2
)
L−m
L−2
3
> 0, completing the proof .
Proof of Lemma 4.3: From (3.6) and the definition of r♯L:m, q
♯
L:m and F
∗
∞(x), one has,
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form = 1, 3, 5, · · · , L−1, F ∗∞(vL:m)−r
♯
L:m = α1:∞+
1−α1:∞
KD
( 1
chigh−cmid
− 1
vL:m−cmid
)− 4
4−α4
(α3+
m−1
2
α4) = α1:∞ +
1−α1:∞
K
( 1
a1
− 1
am
) − 4α3
4−α4
− 2(m−1)
4−α4
α4 = α1:∞ −
4α3
4−α4
+ 1−α1:∞
K
( 1
a1
− 1
am
) −
2(m−1)
4−α4
α4 =
K′−K
K′
−∆
2K′−∆
+ ∆
K′
(m− 3
2
)− 2∆(m−1)
2K′−∆
= ∆
K′(2K ′−∆)
{−K ′+K +(2K ′−∆)(m− 3
2
)−
2K ′(m− 1)} = ∆
K′(2K ′−∆)
{K L−m
L−3
2
− 2K ′} < ∆
K′(2K ′−∆)
{2K − 2K ′} < 0, where K ′
def
= 1
a1
+ 1
aL
,
proving a). For part b), one also has, for m = 1, 3, 5, · · · , L − 3, F ∗∞(vL:m+2) − r
♯
L:m =
α1:∞ +
1−α1:∞
K
( 1
a1
− 1
am+2
) − 4α3
4−α4
− 2(m−1)
4−α4
α4 =
K′−K
K′
−∆
2K′−∆
+ ∆
K′
(m + 1
2
) − 2∆(m−1)
2K′−∆
=
∆
K′(2K ′−∆)
{K L−m−2
L−3
2
+ 2K ′} ≥ ∆
K′(2K ′−∆)
{K L−(L−3)−2
L−3
2
+ 2K ′} > ∆
K′(2K ′−∆)
2K ′ > 0. Next
we prove part c). From (3.6) and the definition of r†L:m, q
†
L:m and F
†
∞(x), one has, for
m = 1, 2, 3, · · · , L − 1, F †∞(vL:m) − r
†
L:m =
1−α6:∞
KD
( 1
chigh−cmid
− 1
vL:m−cmid
) − (m − 1)α5 =
1−(a1/aL)
K
( 1
a1
− 1
am
)−(m−1)∆a1 = a1(
1
a1
− 1
am
)−(m−1)∆a1 = a1{K−(L−m)∆−(m−1)∆} =
a1{(L −
3
2
) − (L − 1)∆} = −1
2
a1∆ < 0 . Finally we prove part d). Similarly as in
part c), one has, for m = 1, 2, 3, · · · , L − 3, F †∞(vL:m+2) − r
†
L:m =
1−α6:∞
KD
( 1
chigh−cmid
−
1
vL:m+2−cmid
)−(m−1)α5 =
1−(a1/aL)
K
( 1
a1
− 1
am+2
)−(m−1)∆a1 = a1(
1
a1
− 1
am+2
)−(m−1)∆a1 =
a1{K − (L −m − 2)∆− (m− 1)∆} = a1{(L−
3
2
)∆ − (L − 3)∆} = 3
2
a1∆ > 0, completing
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.5: We first prove limL→∞ V1(Y1,L, X
†
2,L) = V1(Y1, X
†
2) of c) . The
other cases can be shown similarly. Let Zk, k = 1, · · · , 4 be defined by Z1 = δ
{chigh<Y1<X
†
2}
,
Z2 = δ{chigh<Y1=X†2}
, Z3 = δ{Y1=chigh} and Z
4 = δ{X†
2
=chigh<Y1}
. ZkL, k = 1, · · · , 4 can be
defined similarly by replacing Y1 by Y1,L and X
†
2 by X
†
2,L respectively. We next prove that
ZkL
a.e.
→ Zk, k = 1, · · · , 4 . The following six cases, as depicted in Figure A.3, are considered.
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Figure A.3: Image of the cases
Case1: (ω1, ω2) ∈ {(ω1, ω2)|[chigh < Y1(ω1)] ∧ [chigh < X
†
2(ω2)] ∧ [Y1(ω1) > X
†
2(ω2)]}
Let ǫ
def
= Y1 − X
†
2 > 0. Since Y1,L
a.e.
→ Y1 and X
†
2,L
a.e.
→ X†2 , one has, for sufficiently
large N , that |Y1 − Y1,L| <
ǫ
3
and |X†2 − X
†
2,L| <
ǫ
3
for L > N . It then follows that
ǫ
3
= Y1−
ǫ
3
−X†2 −
ǫ
3
< Y1− (Y1−Y1,L)−X
†
2 − (X
†
2,L−X
†
2) = Y1,L−X
†
2 for L > N . Finally,
these observations imply that
Z1L = Z
1 = 0 for L > N ; and (A.1)
Z2L = Z
2 = 0 for L > N . (A.2)
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From the condition of the Case1, one sees chigh(= vL:1) < Y1. It then follows from the
definition of Y1,L that chigh < Y1,L for all L. Thus one has
Z3 = Z3L = 0 for all L. (A.3)
From the condition of the Case1, one also sees chigh < X
†
2 . Since ω2 ∈ (0, 1], one has ω2 6= 0.
Hence, from the definition of X†2,L, for sufficiently large N , chigh = vL:1 < X
†
2,L, and therefore
Z4 = Z4L = 0 for L > N . (A.4)
Case2: (ω1, ω2) ∈ {(ω1, ω2)|[chigh < Y1(ω1)] ∧ [chigh < X
†
2(ω2)] ∧ [Y1(ω1) < X
†
2(ω2)]}
Let N be sufficiently large number. Then in a similar way as in Case1 it is clear that
Z1L = Z
1 = 1, Z2L = Z
2 = 0 for L > N ; and (A.5)
Z3 = Z3L = 0, Z
4 = Z4L = 0 for all L . (A.6)
Case3: (ω1, ω2) ∈ {(ω1, ω2)|Y1(ω1) = X
†
2(ω2) = U}
From the definition of Y1,L in Lemma 4.5, one sees Y1,L = U for all L. Since ∆ > 0 and
limL˜→∞∆ = 0, one has α6:∞ < q
†
L:L = α6 = a1(
1
aL
+ ∆
2
), and consequenly (1 − α6:∞, 1] ⊂
(1− q†L:L, 1] = (r
†
L:L−1, r
†
L:L]. Since X
†
2(ω2) = U(= vL:L), from the definition of X
†
2 , one has
ω2 ∈ (1−α6:∞, 1] so that ω2 ∈ (r
†
L:L−1, r
†
L:L]. It then follows from the definition of X
†
2,L that
X†2,L = vL:L = U for all L. These observations imply that
[Zk = ZkL = 0, k = 1, 3, 4 ; and Z
2 = Z2L = 1] for all L . (A.7)
Case4: (ω1, ω2) ∈ {(ω1, ω2)|chigh < Y1(ω1) = X
†
2(ω2) < U}
Since it is clear that P [chigh < Y1(ω1) = X
†
2(ω2) < U ] = 0 we do not have to examin limiting
bahavior of ZkL, k = 1, · · · , 4 .
Case5: (ω1, ω2) ∈ {(ω1, ω2)|Y1(ω1) = chigh}
From the definition of Y1,L one has Y1,L = chigh for all L. Hence it is clear that
[Zk = ZkL = 0, k = 1, 2, 4 ; and Z
3 = Z3L = 1] for all L . (A.8)
Case6: (ω1, ω2) ∈ {(ω1, ω2)|X
†
2 = chigh < Y1(ω1)}
From the definition of X†2 , it is clear P [chigh = X
†
2(ω2)] = 0, hence we do not have to examine
limiting behavior of ZkL, k = 1, · · · , 4.
From (A.1),· · · ,(A.8), one obtains that ZkL
a.e.
→ Zk as L→∞ for k = 1, 2, · · · , 4. From
(2.1), one has h1(Y1, X
†
2) = D{2(Y1 − cmid)Z
1 + (Y1 − cmid)Z2 + (chigh − clow)Z3 + (Y1 −
clow)Z
4} . It should be noted that h1(Y1, X
†
2) can be written as the continuous function of
Y1, X
†
2 and Z
k, i = 1, · · · , 4 . According to the a) of this Lemma, Y1,L
a.e.
→ Y1, and ZkL
a.e.
→
Zk, k = 1, · · · , 4, as we prove above. Hence one concludes that limL→∞ V1(Y1,L, X∗2,L) =
limL→∞E[h1(Y1,L, X
∗
2,L)] = E[h1(Y1, X
∗
2 )] = V1(Y1, X
∗
2 ). The other parts of this Lemma can
also be shown in the similar way, completing the proof.
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